United Nations S/2010/370

Security Council

Distr.: General
12 July 2010

Original: English

Identical letters dated 9 July 2010 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council

I write to bring to your attention a developing situation of grave concern to my Government.

It appears that a Moldovan ship, which has been hired and sponsored by a Libyan organization, plans to depart from Greece this Saturday with the claimed purpose of bringing aid to Gaza. In spite of the stated intention of this mission, we are deeply concerned that the true nature of its actions remains dubious. Israel has repeatedly guaranteed that humanitarian aid will be delivered securely through its established channels. Thus, this mission is completely unwarranted.

The declared intentions of this mission are even more questionable and provocative given the recent measures taken by Israel to ensure the increase of humanitarian aid flowing into the Gaza Strip. The Secretary-General and Middle East Quartet have both welcomed these measures taken by Israel.

The Middle East Quartet has clearly stated that all who wish to bring humanitarian aid to Gaza should do so through already established channels. Unfortunately, those who are involved with this Libyan-sponsored ship are undermining real humanitarian efforts. Israel reserves its right under international law to prevent this ship from violating the existing naval blockade on the Gaza Strip.

In view of these circumstances, Israel calls upon the international community to exert its influence on the Government of Libya to demonstrate responsibility and prevent this ship from departing for the Gaza Strip. Israel also expects the related authorities to discourage their nationals from taking part in such action and expects the international community to ensure that this ship does not sail.

I kindly request that this letter be distributed as an official document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Gabriela **Shalev**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

10-44615 (E) 130710

Please recycle

United Nations S/2010/371

Security Council

Distr.: General
12 July 2010

Original: English

Letter dated 9 July 2010 from the Permanent Representative of Nigeria to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to inform you that during the Presidency of Nigeria, the Security Council is scheduled to hold an open debate on the subject "Optimizing the use of preventive diplomacy tools: prospects and challenges in Africa" on Friday, 16 July 2010.

Nigeria has prepared the attached concept note to help guide the discussion on this subject (see annex).

I should be grateful if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) U. Joy **Ogwu**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

10-44556 (E) 120710

Please recycle

Annex to the letter dated 9 July 2010 from the Permanent Representative of Nigeria to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Concept note for the open thematic debate in the Security Council, to be held on 16 July 2010 under the Presidency of Nigeria, on "Optimizing the use of preventive diplomacy tools: prospects and challenges in Africa"

Nigeria proposes to convene an open debate of the Security Council on 16 July 2010 to explore the optimization of the full range of preventive diplomacy tools in the maintenance of international peace and security, particularly in Africa.

Context

African nations have demonstrated their commitment to peace and security as is evident from the work of regional and subregional organizations in Africa. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has established a number of conflict prevention mechanisms including early warning systems for conflict prevention in the Gambia, Benin, Liberia and Burkina Faso. As part of its efforts, ECOWAS has also established the Mediation and Security Council, the Defence and Security Commission and the Council of Elders. Furthermore, the African Union has put in place several conflict prevention mechanisms, such as the Peace and Security Council and the Panel of the Wise, as part of its overarching peace and security architecture. However, conflict and the threat of conflict remain critical concerns for the continent and the question of tackling this problem in a comprehensive manner falls to be considered.

Although primary responsibility for conflict prevention rests with States, the maintenance of international peace and security is the primary responsibility of the Security Council. Peacekeeping missions have emerged as the preferred tool for the United Nations in managing conflicts, and such missions have grown in complexity and scope. Indeed, while in 2000 only 20,000 personnel were deployed for peacekeeping, by 2009 that figure stood at 116,000, with an operational budget of over US$ 7.8 billion. The budget for peacekeeping now stands at US$ 8.5 billion. This has wider implications for Member States, the United Nations Secretariat and stakeholders with respect to decision-making, allocation of resources and management.[1]

Faced with the unprecedented rise in the number and scale of such operations, perhaps the United Nations should consider the benefits inherent in transforming its culture of response after conflict into a culture of prevention to forestall violent conflicts and incalculable losses. A great deal of good work has been done in this respect, particularly as regards the benefits of mediation, conflict resolution and conflict management. By way of example, in concert with regional actors, the

[1] Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, *A New Partnership Agenda: Charting a New Horizon for UN Peacekeeping* (July 2009), p. 4.

United Nations staged a rapid political intervention in Guinea following the violence of September 2009, thereby averting the threat of civil war and obviating the need for the deployment of peacekeeping troops. Similarly, the involvement of the ECOWAS Special Envoy in the Niger helped in dousing a potentially explosive political crisis with possible violent consequences. Following the 2002 ruling of the International Court of Justice, Secretary-General Kofi Annan successfully mediated the arrangements for the transfer of sovereignty between Nigeria and Cameroon in relation to the Bakassi peninsula. More recently, the continuing support provided by the United Nations in the areas of election and socio-economic recovery programmes and security sector reform is part of a suite of political solutions helping to maintain peace, particularly in Guinea.

Notwithstanding success stories like these, the United Nations still lacks a coherent, overarching strategy to ensure that conflict prevention is pursued and achieved in an integrated manner, making the best use of the tools and agencies at its disposal and of those within regional organizations, in a manner that effectively discharges the obligations, under Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations, for the pacific settlement of disputes.

Background

The conceptual shift in United Nations thinking and action in conflict prevention can be traced to the 1992 report of the Secretary-General, *An Agenda for Peace*, which defined preventive diplomacy as "action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur".

The 2001 report of the Secretary-General on the prevention of armed conflict (S/2001/574 and Corr.1) went a step further in recognizing the critical importance of prevention by acknowledging that "the primary responsibility for conflict prevention rests with national Governments and other local actors" and "The role of the United Nations is principally to assist national Governments and their local counterparts in finding solutions to their problems by offering support for the development of national and regional capacities for early warning, conflict prevention and long-term peacebuilding."

Emanating from this policy prescription, the role of United Nations support has evolved beyond the confines of conflict management that had been the traditional purview of the political and peacekeeping departments of the United Nations. It now recognizes that a multidisciplinary and integrated approach to contemporary conflicts is required to complement tools such as mediation, negotiation and good offices, with a range of new process-oriented development tools for inter-group confidence-building, dialogue processes, and skills for building and consolidating the mediation capacities of society.

Questions of alternative dispute resolution in Africa have come before the Security Council on multiple occasions and the issue has been extensively debated

within the Council over the years.[2] Thus, the Council held high-level meeting on the subject in September 2008 and open debate on 21 April 2009, both of which activities have strengthened our collective commitment to the use of preventive diplomacy within the Security Council.

More recently, in January 2010, the Security Council reaffirmed its intention "to promote closer and more operational cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in the fields of conflict early warning, prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding, and to ensure the coherence, synergy and collective effectiveness of their efforts" (S/PRST/2010/1). While these developments are to be applauded, they do not go so far as to set out a comprehensive policy and strategy as a complement to the current peacekeeping model. Peacekeeping is not the only available tool for conflict resolution and management.

Depending on settings and opportunities, preventive diplomacy tools, such as conflict prevention, mediation, good offices, fact-finding missions, negotiation, use of special envoys, informal consultations, peacebuilding and targeted development activities, can be more useful, cost-effective and less risky in delivering desired peace dividends. These strategies can support military activity by addressing discord at the political level, thereby diverting actors from the path to conflict. The development of the United Nations human resource capacity dedicated to mediation and related activities is evidence of a growing commitment to such initiatives.

As a powerful set of tools to facilitate peacebuilding and to operationalize the obligations of the Security Council under Chapter VI of the Charter, preventive diplomacy has the potential to unite, foster trust and cooperation, quell rising violence and, by forestalling armed conflict with its negative consequences, maintain stability and foster peace while preserving the gains of development. The untapped potential therein warrants further investment of resources as the cost savings of such an outcome go well beyond the economic. The practicalities of agreeing and implementing such a policy therefore stand to be debated.

Content of the debate

In order to cultivate peace and fulfil the aims of Chapter VI of the Charter, there is a need to promote strategies involving early identification and appropriate intervention in conflict situations in order to build confidence, trust and, above all, preclude the onset of violence between opposing parties. The measures employed should deter that course of action by presenting the peaceful alternative as a more attractive prospect or a less costly way of achieving a given end. Such interventions

[2] See, inter alia, note by the President of the Security Council outlining the terms of reference and mandate for the ad hoc Working Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa (S/2002/207); letter dated 14 August 2007 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Congo addressed to the Secretary-General, containing terms of reference for the open debate of 28 August 2007 on conflict prevention and resolution, especially in Africa (S/2007/496); discussion of 28 August 2007 on the role of the Security Council in conflict prevention and resolution, in particular in Africa (S/PV.5735 and Resumption 1); report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 1625 (2005) on conflict prevention, particularly in Africa (S/2008/18); report of the Secretary-General on enhancing mediation and its support activities (S/2009/189); and statement by the President of the Security Council on ways to further promote the use of mediation in the peaceful settlement of disputes (S/PRST/2009/8).

might range from promoting intercultural dialogue to more coercive techniques like targeted sanctions.

An effective policy in favour of such preventive diplomacy would necessitate a cooperative approach to those regional and subregional organizations on the ground, which are implementing preventive diplomacy mechanisms. Accordingly, it is imperative that the direction offered by the Security Council in this respect be delivered with specificity, clarity and in a manner that supports, encourages and respects the role of relevant actors, including national Governments, the African Union, ECOWAS and the interests of neighbouring States.

There are a number of challenges associated with this initiative. It is necessary to identify and secure reliable sources of funding to ensure the initiative can be operationalized. Efforts must also be made to build preventive diplomacy capacity and expertise nationally, regionally and within the United Nations machinery, in a manner that harnesses the capacities in the United Nations Development Group, the United Nations Development Programme, the Peacebuilding Commission, the Department of Political Affairs and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (including its Security Sector Reform Unit). The process of advancing the current cooperation of the United Nations with regional and subregional actors in this regard must be carefully coordinated in order to integrate preventive diplomacy into the architecture of conflict prevention, peacebuilding and peacekeeping. Above all, it is necessary to muster the requisite political will to promote preventive diplomacy as a veritable tool for the maintenance of international peace and security. These are issues on which the considered input of the Secretary-General would be appreciated.

It is in the interests of the international community at large to unite around a set of policies which would see preventive diplomacy employed as a matter of course in crisis situations, particularly in Africa.

Questions

In this debate the Security Council should consider the following:

1. How might we achieve agreement on a coherent policy strategy in favour of preventive diplomacy to complement the Organization's current peacekeeping model for Africa?
2. Strategies for better resourcing preventive diplomacy activities.
3. What value might be added to the Council's work in this regard from an update of the Secretary-General's 2008 report on conflict prevention in Africa, which would include, by way of an annex, reporting on relevant situations on the agenda of the Security Council and on other potential crisis situations?
4. How best to mobilize the ad hoc Working Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa to launch a concrete initiative, in partnership with the key regional actors, to achieve optimal use of preventive diplomacy tools in specific pre-conflict situations.
5. The scope for drawing upon resources and know-how from relevant United Nations agencies and regional authorities, such as the African Union Peace and Security Council, the Southern African Development Community and ECOWAS.

6. How best to convert the current peace and security challenges in Africa (e.g., in the Sudan, Somalia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Zimbabwe) into opportunities to partner with local actors, including civil society and women's organizations, to develop and implement comprehensive and realistic preventive diplomacy programmes.

7. In view of the factors that may militate against the application of preventive diplomacy, what might be the most appropriate preventive diplomacy tools in regard to conflict in Africa?

8. What are the benefits of preventive diplomacy and who are its beneficiaries?

United Nations S/2010/372

Security Council

Distr.: General
13 July 2010

Original: English

Letter dated 12 July 2010 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea addressed to the President of the Security Council

On behalf of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea, and in accordance with paragraph 11 of Security Council resolution 1916 (2010), I have the honour to transmit herewith the report of the United Nations Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Somalia on the implementation of paragraphs 4 and 5 of the latter resolution and on any impediments to the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Somalia (see annex).

I would appreciate it if the present letter and its annex were brought to the attention of the members of the Council and issued as a document of the Council.

(*Signed*) Claude **Heller**
Chairman
Security Council Committee established pursuant
to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009)
concerning Somalia and Eritrea

10-44762 (E) 160710

Please recycle

Annex

Letter dated 10 July 2010 from the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator addressed to the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea

In accordance with paragraph 11 of Security Council resolution 1916 (2010), I have the honour to transmit the report of the United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator for Somalia (see enclosure).

In response to the request from the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea, during its mission to Nairobi on 27 April 2010, the humanitarian community working in Somalia defined an "implementing partner", as mentioned in paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 1916 (2010), as follows:

> "Implementing partner", a non-governmental organization or community-based organization that has undergone due diligence to establish its bona fides by a United Nations agency or another non-governmental organization, and that reports when requested to the Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Somalia on mitigation measures. Implementing partners have the following characteristics:
>
> (a) The organization is part of the consolidated appeals process for Somalia (or the common humanitarian fund process);
>
> (b) The organization is represented in a cluster's 3W matrix (*Who does What and Where*).

I would appreciate it if this letter, together with its attachment, could be brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

(*Signed*) John **Holmes**
Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs
and Emergency Relief Coordinator

Enclosure

Report of the United Nations Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Somalia

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 1916 (2010). Paragraph 11 of that resolution requests the Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Somalia to report to the Security Council every 120 days on the implementation of paragraphs 4 and 5 of the resolution and on any impediments to the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Somalia, and requests the United Nations agencies and organizations having observer status with the General Assembly that provide humanitarian assistance to support the Coordinator in this regard.

2. The present, first report covers the period from March 2010 to July 2010. The report focuses mainly on the regions of Somalia under the control of Al Shabaab, which was listed, pursuant to paragraph 8 of Security Council resolution 1844 (2008), by the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea, on 12 April 2010.

3. The report outlines how the humanitarian community operates in Somalia and the role of the Coordinator; the humanitarian situation; impediments to humanitarian aid delivery; and mitigation measures in place to address politicization, misuse and misappropriation.

4. The volatile political and military context in Somalia makes the delivery of humanitarian assistance challenging, but not impossible. To varying degrees, all regions of Somalia require humanitarian action; however, the epicentre of the humanitarian crisis is in central and southern Somalia where humanitarian needs exceed the humanitarian community's current ability to deliver. The humanitarian imperative to assist those in need means that the humanitarian community in Somalia must try to continue to operate even under the most adverse conditions.

5. Under these circumstances, the Coordinator seeks to ensure that there is a level of monitoring that is realistic, rooted in the principle of due diligence, and reflects a standard that is as reasonable and effective as it can be in this context.

II. The humanitarian system

6. At the global level, the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator is responsible for oversight of all emergencies requiring United Nations humanitarian action. The global Inter-Agency Standing Committee represents the highest humanitarian policy body, and comprises major humanitarian non-governmental organizations, humanitarian United Nations and international agencies, and standing invitees such as the International Committee of the Red Cross and the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. The Inter-Agency Standing Committee is chaired by the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator. In a country affected by a disaster or conflict, the Emergency Relief Coordinator appoints a Humanitarian Coordinator.

7. The Coordinator is responsible for leading and coordinating humanitarian assistance with a view to ensuring that it is principled, timely, effective and efficient. The overall objective of humanitarian assistance is to alleviate human suffering and protect lives, livelihoods and the dignity of populations in need. The Coordinator's role is to build consensus among all relevant organizations involved in humanitarian action, and to actively facilitate cooperation among them, while recognizing that many organizations have specific mandates and will operate independently.

8. In undertaking humanitarian action, the Coordinator and the humanitarian community are guided by international humanitarian law, by human rights law and by internationally accepted humanitarian principles. These principles call for assistance to be delivered by independent and neutral humanitarian organizations that are motivated by the principle of humanity and deliver in an impartial manner.

III. Constraints on humanitarian access and their operational implications

9. Somalia continues to experience a protracted and complex emergency, exacerbated by a fragile central government that does not control most of the country and is in conflict with various insurgent groups vying for power. Armed conflict involving State and non-State armed actors has resulted in loss of life, frequent and continued displacement, the spread of disease, loss of livelihoods, food insecurity and one of the highest malnutrition rates in the world, with around 240,000 malnourished children under 5 years of age, of whom 63,000 are acutely malnourished. Overall it is estimated that 1 in 6 Somali children are malnourished; while in the southern and central regions the ratio is 1 in 5.

10. Currently, an estimated 3.2 million people, or 43 per cent of the country's population, depend on humanitarian assistance. This includes 1.4 million internally displaced persons, of whom 655,000 require the greatest levels of humanitarian assistance. Most internally displaced persons currently reside in the Afgooye Corridor, one of the largest concentrations of internally displaced persons in the world, with approximately 366,000 internally displaced persons. Since March 2010, the exposure of civilians to hostilities has resulted in the displacement of over 64,000 people of whom roughly 42,000 have fled Mogadishu for other parts of Somalia.

11. Humanitarian operations are continually affected by the conduct of both State and non-State armed actors. The implications of their actions on humanitarian operations are manifested by uneven and constantly fluctuating access for humanitarian actors to populations in need. In northern Somalia where local governments exist, the humanitarian operations of the United Nations and non-governmental organizations remain generally unimpeded, although operating under their respective security protocols. Access to populations in central Somalia constantly varies owing to frequent fighting, with territory often changing hands between various groups. In southern Somalia where non-State armed groups are in control of nearly all of the territory, fighting is localized, brief and sporadic; nevertheless, access remains limited owing to the low acceptance of humanitarian aid and actors on the part of some local armed groups. In Mogadishu, fighting is nearly continuous and intense. In the last four months, two of the main hospitals in

Mogadishu admitted over 1,384 war casualties of whom 328 were children under 5 years of age. Access in Mogadishu is possible at times but difficult because of insecurity, threats and changes of control of different areas of the city.

12. During the reporting period, non-State armed actors were responsible for 13 incidents against United Nations and non-governmental organizations' assets and facilities. In March and April 2010, two United Nations compounds and warehouses storing non-food items, in the Bu'aale and Waajid districts of southern Somalia, were occupied and looted. Implementing partners reported that their compounds had fared no better, with 11 compounds having been looted or occupied, or their staff having been ordered to cease humanitarian operations. In many instances, national staff were intimidated and sometimes arrested and ordered to stop working for their organizations.

13. The humanitarian community reported that non-State armed actors, on at least nine occasions, demanded that staff of the United Nations and non-governmental organizations must register and pay taxes. On one occasion a non-State armed actor imposed the requirement on a humanitarian organization that it rent commercial space in order for it to be permitted to operate. Humanitarian actors reported significant delays in the delivery of humanitarian assistance until conditions to be able to operate in accordance with humanitarian principles could be established. Where non-State armed actors have categorically dismissed the operational requirements of humanitarian actors, this has eventually led to the suspension of humanitarian programmes.

14. Despite these difficulties, the ability to continue assistance, as well as retain a rapid response capacity in situations of acute humanitarian need, has been maintained because of a deliberate change in operational practices by humanitarian actors. Whereas in the past the international staff of both the United Nations and non-governmental organizations were permanently based in Somalia, their departure because of security risks has meant that the main responsibility for humanitarian operations rests with national staff and national implementing partners on the ground. This comes at a price. Limited presence of international personnel restricts the scale and scope of humanitarian programming and results in considerable transfer of security risks to the national personnel of United Nations agencies and of international and national non-governmental organizations.

15. Finally, a lack of centralized command structures among non-State armed actors is a further impediment to broad-based humanitarian access. Decision-making generally is left to local commanders, meaning that humanitarian access varies district by district and region by region.

16. Still, in this very difficult environment, humanitarian programming continues. While it has not been possible to meet the thresholds of international humanitarian assistance standards in all respects, the humanitarian community has been able to make some progress and achieve significant humanitarian impact. A mid-year review process showed a positive impact of programmes on indicators such as immunization coverage, access and quality of nutrition services for severely malnourished children, and school enrolment rates, particularly among internally displaced populations. Since the beginning of 2010, in regions accessible to the United Nations and implementing partners, nearly 1.5 million children under age 5 and 1.3 million women of childbearing age were reached during child health days campaigns, providing them with an essential package of health and nutrition

services including measles and polio immunization. In some areas where these campaigns were conducted, vaccination coverage increased from 30 per cent to over 70 per cent. The health sector has placed emphasis on emergency health care for civilian casualties of the conflict, particularly in Mogadishu and through the establishment of a field hospital in Bu'aale.

IV. Risk mitigation measures

17. Security Council resolution 1916 (2010) calls on Member States and the United Nations to take all feasible steps to mitigate politicization, misuse and misappropriation of humanitarian assistance by armed groups and requests the Coordinator to report every 120 days on such implementation measures.

18. The United Nations country team for Somalia had already developed risk mitigation measures as a result of working in a high-risk environment for many years. In the light of new risks identified, and because of the reduction of United Nations staff presence in Somalia, in May 2009 the country team initiated an inter-agency risk assessment exercise to determine operational risks and develop recommendations for their mitigation. The country team adopted the recommendations and committed to incorporating risk management principles and methodology in its operations. The country team created a risk management committee and appointed a risk manager to enable the identification of an Enterprise Risk Management strategic process.

19. The country team prioritized the development of a contractor database, which will provide a mechanism to record and share information on service providers and contractors and facilitate inter-agency consultations. It will also enable the tracking of existing contracts and provide a first stage performance assessment and a due diligence process. The database is currently in the testing of functionality phase.

20. The difficult operating environment in Somalia, coupled with a very limited pool of contractors, results in contracting arrangements with a small group of influential contractors. These contractors are able to pass across different clan territories and interact with non-State armed actors, and arrange end-to-end delivery of goods, including ensuring the security of the goods. Such contractual arrangements, however, carry with them significant security risks, which is why due diligence procedures are understood to be essential. To mitigate these risks, database user security protocols are included in the design, development and management of the contractor database, as well as within the review of the due diligence process.

21. Currently, the risk manager is developing operational risk categories to improve the understanding of the risk environment in Somalia and to enhance reporting. Additionally, risk management tools such as an organizational risk matrix assessment and an information grading process, to determine the validity and reliability of information, are being created.

22. The Inter-Agency Standing Committee for Somalia has long recognized the challenges involved in providing humanitarian assistance in areas under the control of non-State armed actors. As a result, three inter-agency frameworks have been agreed, two of which provide guidance on the management of field operations and establish common ground rules on how to interact with non-State armed actors, in accordance with humanitarian principles. The third framework, built on the earlier

two, refined the approach leading to more rigorous criteria for interaction with non-State armed actors.

23. United Nations and non-governmental organization humanitarian actors employ various strategies to mitigate the potential politicization of humanitarian aid or funds by armed groups. Published mandates, mission and vision statements, and "code of conduct" documents identify the individual organizations as non-political entities operating for the sole purpose of alleviating human suffering in an impartial manner. Such widespread public communication has contributed to reducing the risk of politicizing humanitarian aid. Additionally, organizations work directly with affected populations, and by using community elders to help identify community needs, are able to mitigate possible political or military interference. A few organizations also use the Inter-Agency Standing Committee framework documents to explain to non-State actors why an organization cannot make any payments to work in an area, and why withdrawal and suspension of humanitarian operations would be necessary should payment continue to be demanded.

24. To mitigate against the misuse of humanitarian aid, organizations also implement measures such as community-based participatory assessments and the use of monitors who are separate and independent from each other. Monitoring involves the triangulation of information to verify that the intended population has received the expected humanitarian assistance. Monitoring also evaluates the strengths and weaknesses of a particular distribution or service. Such a monitoring mechanism is particularly critical in regions where organizations have limited or no access. Community-based participatory assessments ensure the proper targeting of beneficiaries. An additional measure that is used in humanitarian sectors such as nutrition, health, water, sanitation and hygiene is "results monitoring". This methodology confirms the impact a particular action has had on an affected population. Should the impact be negligible or negative, this allows organizations to adjust aid and service delivery procedures.

25. Financial transactions can be vulnerable to misuse of resources. Therefore, monitoring and auditing from headquarters, in addition to that of country or field offices, is common practice. Strong relationships between the United Nations and non-governmental organizations and their respective local implementing partners are critical. Implementing partners are selected because of their capacity and technical skills. Some organizations pre-screen prospective implementing partners against the Consolidated List. Finally, organizations employ various public information strategies to inform the beneficiary population of their rights and entitlements under specific humanitarian programmes. Such transparency helps prevent misuse of humanitarian aid.

26. Implementing partners report that misappropriation mitigation measures include long-standing relationships and trust with communities they work with, coupled with the monitoring of projects and rigorous donor reporting requirements. Clear financial audit and reporting instructions to implementing partners are important to mitigate misappropriation. Cross-verification measures with community elders and the use of visual images and radio broadcasts assist in mitigating possible misappropriation of humanitarian aid.

27. The numerous mitigation measures and strategies either in place or under development recognize that politicization, misuse and misappropriation are serious concerns that warrant time and energy to address them. This is not to suggest that

the mitigation regime is able to counter every possible permutation of these risks. However, the humanitarian community has recognized that in order to preserve humanitarian operations, each organization must institute and continually improve their mitigation measures. The humanitarian community working in Somalia is committed to ensuring that humanitarian programmes have the necessary impact on the lives of the affected populations and are credible to the donors.

V. The impact of resolution 1916 (2010)

28. Owing to the recent introduction of the resolution, it has not yet been possible to ascertain a direct impact of the resolution on humanitarian programming. Although there is no direct link, the resolution was adopted at a time when a number of Member States designated Al Shabaab as a terrorist organization, and concomitantly either suspended or restricted funding to Somalia pending the drafting of procedures to facilitate humanitarian funding. According to the Financial Tracking Service of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, new funding (not counting carry-over from 2009) for the consolidated appeals process has reached only $160 million, which is 40 per cent less than the amount of new funding received at the same time last year.

29. The humanitarian community continues to battle a substantial decline in funding. This decline has significantly affected the community's ability to continue and maintain programming proportionate to humanitarian needs. While the Security Council designation applied only to Al Shabaab and areas under its control, the overall decline in funding has had a broader impact on humanitarian interventions in Somalia. Funding to areas not controlled by Al Shabaab has partly resumed, although the more complex approval process and reporting requirements resulted in delays in providing emergency humanitarian assistance.

30. The humanitarian community working in Somalia has raised two wider concerns with regard to the consequences of these humanitarian operations. First, the belief that humanitarian operations are being conducted in accordance with humanitarian principles, which is essential in a politically and militarily charged environment, is being eroded. This is especially the case for the principles of neutrality and impartiality; the confidence in the neutrality of humanitarian actors has declined owing to perceptions by the Somali population that humanitarian priorities are being overtaken by political considerations; and confidence in impartiality of humanitarian action has waned because populations where humanitarian aid can be delivered are selected not only according to their needs, but also on the basis of who controls the territory they live in. Second, there is the perception among affected populations that they are being treated unfairly for reasons they do not understand. This perception has affected the working relationships and trust between the humanitarian organizations and the affected populations.

VI. Conclusion

31. During the reporting period, humanitarian access and the ability to reach populations in need were restricted but not impossible. Localized decision-making by non-State actors allowed humanitarian interventions in much of central and

southern Somalia, though not systematically or continuously, thus limiting the kinds of interventions possible. A flexible approach and the continued support of national non-governmental organizations have nevertheless allowed humanitarian assistance to reach millions of people in need.

32. Mitigation measures to address politicization, misuse and misappropriation of humanitarian assistance are in place, and additional measures are continually being developed to respond to the changing and complex environment in Somalia. The measures in place help to ensure that humanitarian action is conducted in accordance with humanitarian principles, is used legitimately for its intended purpose, and helps to fulfil the entitlements of civilian populations under international humanitarian law. Mitigation measures, out of necessity, are dynamic and must respond to the changing context and conditions in Somalia. The challenge for the humanitarian community is to ensure the continuous development of appropriate methodologies, distribution mechanisms and monitoring systems that maintain appropriate and timely levels of humanitarian assistance, while meeting more rigorous reporting requirements.

United Nations A/64/863–S/2010/373

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
12 July 2010

Original: English

General Assembly
Sixty-fourth session
Agenda items 13, 14 and 18

Security Council
Sixty-fifth year

Prevention of armed conflict

Protracted conflicts in the GUAM area and their implications for international peace, security and development

The situation in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan

Letter dated 9 July 2010 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to draw your attention to the ongoing violations of the ceasefire by the military forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan, recorded for the period from 1 June to 1 July 2010 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would circulate the present letter and its annex as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 13, 14 and 18, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Karine **Khoudaverdian**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

10-44627 (E) 140710

Please recycle

Annex to the letter dated 9 July 2010 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Violations of the ceasefire by the armed forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan from 1 June to 1 July 2010

N	(Direction)	Date, time	Firing from Azerbaijani side	
			Type of weapon	Ammunition
1.	Berdzruni	01.06.10 12.40	Firearm	2
2.	Berdzruni	01.06.10 15.25	SVD	2
3.	Berdzruni	01.06.10 20.05	Firearm	3
4.	Berdzruni	01.06.10 20.30	Firearm	5
5.	Berdzruni	01.06.10 21.00	Firearm	15
6.	Berdzruni	02.06.10 10.50	Firearm	6
7.	Berdzruni	02.06.10 10.55	Firearm	2
8.	Berdzruni	02.06.10 11.05	Firearm SVD	2 1
9.	Berdzruni	02.06.10 11.10	Firearm	4
10.	Berdzruni	02.06.10 12.27	Firearm	7
11.	Berdzruni	02.06.10 22.05	RPK	10
12.	Nakhkhayal	03.06.10 11.05	SVD	10
13.	Chinari	03.06.10 20.20	PK	10
14.	Chinari	03.06.10 20.20	PK	15
15.	Chinari	03.06.10 21.30	Firearm	6
16.	Berdzruni	03.06.10 19.00	Firearm	5
17.	Khndzorut	03.06.10 21.00	Firearm	2
18.	Berdzruni	05.06.10 12.30	PK SVD machine gun 12.7mm	15 9 8
19.	Berdzruni	08.06.10 19.30	Firearm SVD	5 4
20.	Khndzorut	09.06.10 14.40	Firearm	2
21.	Berdzruni	09.06.10 15.38	Firearm SVD	3 3
22.	Tsaghkunq	09.06.10 20.30	Firearm	15
23.	Berdzruni	09.06.10 20.35	Firearm	3
24.	Berkaberd	10.06.10 19.15	Firearm	10
25.	Zangakunq	10.06.10 06.40	Firearm SVD	2 3
26.	Nerqin Karmirakhbyur	12.06.10 15.30	Firearm	8

27	Kol	12.06.10 20.45	Firearm	10
28	Voskepar	13.06.10 12.30	Firearm	3
29	Beitstun	13.06.10 19.05	Firearm	4
30	Beitstun	13.06.10 19.45	Firearm	4
31	Divvekh	15.06.10 06.35	Firearm	10
32	Aygetzar	15.06.10 21.35	SVD	7
33	Divvekh	15.06.10 22.35	Firearm	20
34	Divvekh	15.06.10 22.50	SVD	7
35	Voskevan	17.06.10 13.10	Firearm	1
36	Aygepar	17.06.10 18.35	Firearm	5
37	Aygepar	17.06.10 18.56	Firearm	5
38	Ereskh	18.06.10 22.50	Firearm	3
39	Ereskh	18.06.10 22.00	Firearm	1
40	Ekhvard	20.06.10 07.50	Firearm	3
41	Sev Gar	20.06.10 23.08	Firearm	15
42	Beitstun	20.06.10 23.20	Firearm	11
43	Kob	21.06.10 00.35	Firearm	5
44	Kob	21.06.10 00.30	Firearm	3
45	Seigther	21.06.10 15.30	SVD	9
46	Beitstun	21.06.10 15.40	Firearm	6
47	Zorag	21.06.10 14.00	Firearm	2
48	Sarakamavan	22.06.10 20.45	Firearm	4
49	Beitstun	22.06.10 21.40	Firearm	10
50	Berdavan	23.06.10 17.05	SVD	2
51	Nerqin Karmirakhpyur	24.06.10 17.10	Firearm	1
52	Berdzvan	24.06.10 18.30	SVD RK	11 20
53	Berdzvan	25.06.10 01.45	Firearm	7
54	Berdzvan	24.06.10 22.50-23.10	machine gun 12.7mm RPK Firearm	4 30 20
55	Berdavan	26.06.10 11.20	SVD	4
56	Aygepar	26.06.10 14.38	Firearm	1
57	Berdavan	26.06.10 10.45	SVD	2

58	Getsaven	26.06.10 11.30	SVD	2
59	Ernakh	26.06.10 22.30	Firearm	10
60	Ernakh	26.06.10 22.40	Firearm	10
61	Khndzorut	26.06.10 09.05	Firearm	2
62	Berdaven	27.06.10 23.40	Firearm	5
63	Berdaven	28.06.10 03.10	Firearm	2
64	Aygepar	28.06.10 06.20	RPK	22
65	Khndzorut	27.06.10 11.20	Firearm	3
66	Berdzrum	27.06.10 11.20	Firearm	3
67	Berdaven	28.06.10 12.20	Firearm	3
68	Berdaven	28.06.10 23.20	Firearm	4
69	Khndzorut	28.06.10 18.00	Firearm	2
70	Berdzrum	28.06.10 22.00	SVD	3
71	Ernakh	28.06.10 22.15	Firearm	2
72	Aygehovit	29.06.10 24.00	Firearm	300
73	Shaverzhaven	29.06.10 07.30	Firearm	9
74	Berdaven	29.06.10 17.20	SVD	15
75	Berdaven	29.06.10 19.30	machine gun 12.7 mm	20
76	Berdaven	29.06.10 20.00	PK	20
77	Berdaven	30.06.10 02.20	Firearm	15
78	Movses	29.06.10 22.30	Firearm	8
79	Movses	30.06.10 12.20	Firearm	3
80	Berdaven	01.07.10 12.20	Firearm	5
81	Berdaven	01.07.10 15.40	SVD	3

The violations of the ceasefire by the armed forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan on the borderline of Armenia from 1 June to 1 July 2010:

Number of violations – 81
Shots – about 934 (PK –85, RPK 5.45 mm –62, SVD - 101, machine gun 12.7mm –20, sniper weapon 12.7mm - 12, AK –654.

The violations of the ceasefire by the armed forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan on the line of contact of Nagorno Karabakh from 1 June to 1 July 2010:

Number of violations – 347
Shots – about 4743 (RPG-7 - 1, PK –546, RPK 5.45 mm –40, SVD - 87, machine gun 12.7mm –152, sniper weapon 12.7mm - 14, AK –3903).

United Nations S/2010/374

Security Council

Distr.: General
6 July 2010

Original: English

Report of the Secretary-General concerning the credentials of the alternate representatives of Japan on the Security Council

Pursuant to rule 15 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, the Secretary-General wishes to report that he has received a letter dated 6 July 2010 from the Permanent Representative of Japan to the United Nations stating that Mr. Kazuchika Hamuro and Mr. Shigehiro Nishiumi have been appointed alternate representatives of Japan on the Security Council.

In the opinion of the Secretary-General, that communication constitutes adequate provisional credentials.

10-44621 (E) 130710

Please recycle

United Nations S/2010/375

Security Council

Distr.: General
13 July 2010
English
Original: French

Letter dated 8 July 2010 from the Permanent Representative of Chad to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

By order of my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you, for the attention of the Security Council, the following events that illustrate the carrying out by the Chadian authorities of their mission to protect civilians in eastern Chad, in accordance with their commitments as stipulated in Security Council resolution 1923 (2010).

1. At around 1400 hours on 6 June 2010, Hubert Blama (logistics coordinator for the non-governmental organization Oxfam and a British citizen), his colleague Frank Gontou and their driver were carjacked 60 metres from a restaurant called "Rose de Sable". Frank Gontou and the driver were freed by the kidnappers 70 kilometres away after having been robbed of their money and telephone equipment.

Having been notified of this incident, the regional administrative and military authorities ordered elements of the Détachement intégré de sécurité (DIS) and the Garde nationale et nomade du Tchad to find them. The pursuit undertaken by those personnel led them to a point some 50 kilometres from Guéréda, a town located roughly 160 kilometres north-east of Abéché.

The defence and security forces were able to surround the area where the kidnappers had taken refuge and prevented them from crossing the border for nine days before launching the attack that permitted the third employee of Oxfam, the British citizen Hubert Blama, to be freed by the joint Chad-Sudan force on 15 June 2010. The kidnappers were arrested in Sarné and taken into custody.

In a communiqué issued on Wednesday, Oxfam welcomed the freeing of its employee and commended "all the parties involved, particularly the Government of Chad and members of the international community, for their efforts".

2. At around 1 a.m. on Sunday 27 June, a gang armed with assault rifles invaded the headquarters of the non-governmental organization Intermoon Oxfam in Koukou Angarana. The assailants took Miss Sandrine Robert, a French national, along with two vehicles, a computer and a portable telephone. Notified at around 2.15 a.m. by the Regional Chief of Security of the United Nations System, the Security Service of the Coordination nationale d'appui à la force internationale à l'est du Tchad (CONAFIT) immediately contacted the local authorities, including the General Secretary of the Governor of Sila, the Commissioner of DIS and the Legion

Commandant of the Gendarmerie. On the instructions of those authorities, elements of DIS immediately began to pursue the assailants.

At around 6.30 a.m., the Prefect of Goz-Beïda announced that the DIS agents had intercepted the criminals at the entrance to a village called Fagata, located 20 kilometres east of Koukou Angarana. During the skirmish with the security forces, the bandits left everything behind in order to escape. Miss Sandrine Robert was thus found safe and sound, but the two recovered vehicles had substantial damage.

3. Following these unfortunate events, several decisions were taken during a meeting between the non-governmental organizations and the Government on security issues for humanitarian workers:

- All encampments of non-governmental organizations must be surrounded with barbed wire;
- The encampments must be equipped with two-way radios for direct coordination with elements of DIS and the United Nations security system liaison officer;
- All suspicious persons having a negative attitude who are working for non-governmental organizations (support personnel or others) must be brought to the attention of the State security services.

I should be grateful if you could arrange to have the present letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Ahmad **Allam-mi**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

United Nations S/2010/376

Security Council

Distr.: General
12 July 2010

Original: English

Letter dated 8 July 2010 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to refer to Security Council resolution 1928 (2010), by which the Council decided to extend until 12 June 2011 the mandate of the Panel of Experts, as specified in paragraph 26 of resolution 1874 (2009), and requested the Secretary-General to take the necessary administrative measures to that effect.

Accordingly, I wish to inform you that, after consulting with the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006), I have reappointed the following experts:

Mr. Masahiko Asada, Japan (nuclear issues);

Mr. David J. Birch, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (proliferation of weapons of mass destruction);

Mr. Victor D. Comras, United States of America (finance);

Mr. Erik Marzolf, France (missile technology);

Mr. Young-wan Song, Republic of Korea (regional issues);

Mr. Alexander Vilnin, Russian Federation (customs);

Mr. Xiaodong Xue, China (export control, nuclear items).

I have designated Mr. David J. Birch to serve as Coordinator of the Panel of Experts.

I should be grateful if you would bring this information to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) **BAN** Ki-moon

10-44670 (E) 120710

Please recycle